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O ne of the more significant, but inadequately recognized, developments in the field of the law of war which has occurred during the past 
half-century is that with respect to the institution of the Protecting Power. 
Surprisingly little has been written, especially in English, either on the general 
subject of the Protecting Power or on the specific subject of the Protecting 
Power and its relationship to the prisoner-of-war problem.1 This article will 
endeavor, to a necessarily limited extent, to fill that void, with the emphasis 
being placed on the gradual, but steady, expansion of the authority, 
responsibility, and functions of the Protecting Power in ~afeguarding the welfare 
of prisoners of war. 
The term Protecting Power is comparatively simple of definition. It is a state 
which has accepted the responsibility of protecting the interests of another state 
in the territory of a third, with which, for some reason, such as war, the second 
state does not maintain diplomatic relations.2 Because the protection is most 
frequently rendered to nationals of the protected state found in the third state, 
the former is often referred to as the Power of Origin and the latter as the Power 
of Residence. For obvious reasons, in the case of prisoners of war the state by 
which they are held is known as the Detaining Power rather than as the Power of 
Residence. And while the term Power of Origin may be a misnomer in the case of 
certain prisoners of war, as, for example, those who were captured while serving 
in the armed forces of a state other than their own, it will be used herein for 
lack of a more appropriate term. 
I. Historical 
The earliest indication of what we now term the Protecting Power probabl~ 
appeared in the Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century. 
Curiously enough, in those early days protection of non-nationals came about, 
not as a result of agreements reached with the Power of Residence by the Power 
of Origin, but as a result of agreements reached with the Power of Residence 
by the prospective Protecting Power itself, the latter having probably been 
primarily concerned with the resulting increase in its own prestige and influence 
in the territory in which it was acting and in the home territories of the protected 
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persons. At that period the Protecting Power was, and in the three succeeding 
centuries it remained, completely a creature of custom and usage, with no 
conventional basis, definition, or functions. As a result, the extent of the activity 
of Protecting Powers varied in different countries and even, with respect to 
different Protecting Powers, within the same country. The passage of time 
resulted in the passing of the initiative for the designation of a Protecting Power 
in a particular case from the Protecting Power to the Power of Origin, where 
it more properly belonged. It also resulted in the concept of the Protecting 
Power as an international institution becoming more and more firmly intrenched 
in international law and practice. In its present form, however, the Protecting 
Power dates back less than one century-and its codified form is of even more 
recent vintage. 
Most writers attribute the modem genesis of the Protecting Power to 
developments which occurred during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). In 
that conflict, probably for the first time, all of the belligerents were represented 
by Protecting Powers in the territory of the enemy. England was charged with 
the protection of the French in Germany; and the United States, Switzerland, 
and Russia acted as Protecting Powers in France for the various German States.4 
It may be said that the expansion of the functions of the Protecting Power during 
this conflict was, in large measure, due to two practices which originated during 
its course: that of expellin~ enemy consuls; and that of imposing stringent 
restrictions on enemy aliens. Unquestionably, each of these practices could and 
did contribute to the need for the enlargement of the functions of the Protecting 
Power. 
The precedents established during the Franco-Prussian War were adhered to 
in most subsequent international conflicts, many of which had, however, their 
own peculiar aspects. Thus, in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) each side 
requested the United States to act as its Protecting Power and so we find the 
same state acting as the Protecting Power for each belligerent within the territory 
of the other. Similarly, Germany acted as the Protecting Power for both 
belligerents in the !talo-Turkish War (1911-1912) and in the Sino-Soviet War 
(1929). Going to the other extreme, in the Greco-Turkish War (1897), Germany 
acted as the Protecting Power for Turkey in Greece, while three other nations, 
England, France, and Russia, acted joindy for Greece in Turkey; in the 
Spanish-American War (1898), England acted as the Protecting Power for the 
United States, while France and Austria-Hungary acted joindy for Spain (it was 
during this conflict that, for the first time recorded, a belligerent, the United 
States, specifically requested neutral inspection of installations within which 
prisoners of war were being held);6 and during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) 
France and Russia actedjoindy as the Protecting Power for Montenegro. This 
practice of using more than one friendly state as a Protecting Power has since 
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almost disappeared, although at one time during World War II Spain was acting 
as the Protecting Power for Japan in the continental United States, while Sweden 
acted for her in Hawaii, and Switzerland in American Samoa. 
The Boer War (1899-1902) may, perhaps, be considered to have been, at 
least to some extent, an exception to what was fast becoming a firmly established 
institution of international law. Early in that conflict the British requested the 
United States to represent their interests with the Boers. Apparendy the consent 
of the Boers was not sought and they not only failed to designate a Protecting 
Power of their own, but, for all practical purposes, at first refused to recognize 
the right of the United States consular representatives to act on behalf of the 
British. Subsequendy the Boers did agree to permit the United States consuls in 
their territory to perform certain specific and limited functions with respect to 
British prisoners of war, upon the understanding that United States consuls in 
England would have similar privileges with respect to Boer prisoners of war held 
there.7 Thus, to a limited degree, the institution of the Protecting Power was 
recognized even here. 
The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) found the Protecting Powers once 
again exercising the full powers which it had become customary to allot to them. 
Perhaps as a result of the favorable experiences of the Sino-Japanese War, 
immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities Japan requested the United States 
to act on its behalf in Russia; while France was designated by Russia as its 
Protecting Power in Japan and Korea. And once again, but to an even greater 
extent than during the Spanish-American War, we find the representatives of 
the Protecting Powers concerning themselves with the welfare of prisoners of 
8 war. 
Thus it can readily be seen that when World War I burst upon Europe, the 
designation of Protecting Powers by belligerents was a firmly established 
international custom, although the Protecting Power as an institution had yet 
to be the subject of international legislation. During the course of that conflict 
four definite items of progress occurred: first, it was during World War I that 
public opinion in the belligerent countries achieved an understanding of how a 
friendly neutral could represent, at times vigorously, an enemy belligerent and 
its nationals;9 second, the use of the Protecting Power as a means ofsafeguarding 
the welfare of prisoners of war, although at first somewhat restricted, was later 
gready extended and received rather general acceptance;10 third, the practice 
was adopted that when a neutral which had been acting as a Protecting Power 
itself became embroiled in the conflict, a successor Protecting Power would be 
designated to fill the vacuum; 11 and finally, the Protecting Power received legal 
recognition in a number of international agreements entered into by various of 
the belligerents during the course of the hostilities in which, to a su~rising 
extent, its functions were spelled out with some degree of definiteness. 1 
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The precedents established during World War I were destined to bear fruit. 
A draft prisoner of war convention prepared in 1921 by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter referred to as the ICRC) , while 
contemplating the use of Protecting Powers for certain limited purposes, would 
have assigned to the ICRC the responsibility for establishing mobile 
commissions composed of neutrals charged with assuring that the belligerents 
were complying with the convention. This proposal was probably due to two 
factors: first, the failure of the states which had acted as Protecting Powers during 
World War I adequately to report their activities; and second, the belief that the 
duties involved in the effective protection of the rights of prisoners of war would 
exceed the capacity of the diplomatic personnel of Protecting Powers.13 
However, when the Diplomatic Conference convened in Geneva in 1929 and 
drafted the convention which subsequently received the ratification of the vast 
majority of states, the ICRC proposal was not adopted and, instead, the basic 
principle of the Protecting Power received general acceptance, the former 
Protecting Powers taking the position that all that was needed to assure their 
activities was that their role "be distinctly set out, and their task clearly 
defined.,,14 The Prisoner of War Convention drafted at that Conference15 thus 
became the first international agreement negotiated in time of J?eace to give 
official recognition to the institution of the Protecting Power.1 However, it 
did not create a new international concept. It did not make the use of the 
Protecting Power by belligerents obligatory. It did not affect the relationships 
which had previously existed between the Power of Origin, the Protecting 
Power, and the Detaining Power. It did give the relationship a formal and agreed 
status which it had not previously had. It may well be considered that the 
provisions of the 1929 Convention relating to Protecting Powers constituted 
the most important advance contained in that convention over the provisions 
of the regulations relating to prisoners of war contained in the Annex to the 
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907.17 The lessons learned during World War 
I had not been forgotten. 
The advent of World War II provided, all too soon, an opportunity for the 
implementation and testing of this novel international legislation. Most of the 
belligerents were represented by Protecting Powers and, in general, these found 
the provisions of the 1929 Convention relating to their activities extremely 
helpful. True, the designation and functioning of Protecting Powers on behalf 
of prisoners of war had previously become an almost universally accepted custom 
in international law. But it is necessary to bear in mind that, despite this, in the 
U.S.S.R. and Japan, neither of which nations was a party to the 1929 
Convention, there was either complete or substantial failure in the functioning 
of the Protecting Powers.18 In general, the fact that such a large number of 
countries were parties to the World War II hostilities had two distinct but related 
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results. In the first place, not only did the absence of strong neutrals present a 
problem in the selection of Protecting Powers, but it also meant that there was 
no large neutral world public opinion to be affected by violations of the 
convention, and the power of neutral public opinion in forcing compliance with 
a humanitarian convention cannot be overestimated. And in the second place, 
because of the small number of neutrals available to act as Protecting Powers, it 
frequently occurred that the same neutral was designated to act as the Protecting 
Power for two opposing belligerents. 
Once again wartime lessons were not forgotten and on August 12, 1949,just 
four years after the final termination of World War II, a new Prisoner of War 
Convention19 was signed in which, as we shall see, the functions of the 
Protecting Power are identified and defined with even greater particularity than 
had been the case in the 1929 Convention.20 Since that time the hostilities in 
Korea have occurred. At the outbreak of those hostilities General Douglas 
MacArthur, as the commander of the United Nations Command, immediately 
announced that his forces would comply with the humanitarian principles of 
the 1949 Convention. In answer to a query made by the ICRC, the Foreign 
Minister of the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent a message 
to the Secretary General of the United Nations stating that its forces were 
"strictl:t; abiding by principles of Geneva Conventions in respect to Prisoners of 
War." 1 Unfortunately, the provisions of the convention relating to the 
Protecting Power were evidently not among the principles with which they 
were "strictly abiding" so that, despite all efforts expended in this regard, those 
. . . 1 d 22 provlSlons were never Imp emente . 
From the foregoing brief historical survey it is apparent that prior to 1870 
only the precursors of the modem Protecting Power existed, and not the latter 
itself; that during the period from 1870 to 1914 the concept of the Protecting 
Power began to take form, particularly with respect to its relationship to the 
problem of the prisoner of war; and that during the period subsequent to 1914 
the form has become definite, the institution of the Protecting Power having 
become the subject of numerous bilateral and multilateral international 
agreements, culminating in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to which most of the 
nations of the world are parties.23 It now becomes appropriate to analyze the 
form and the character which the Protecting Power received during this 
1 . 24 evo unonary process. 
II. The Modern Concept of the Protecting Power 
A. Designation 
As will have been noted, Article 86 of the 1929 Convention was, to say the 
least, somewhat vaguely worded: 
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The High Contracting Parties recognize that the regular application of the present 
Convention will find a guaranty in the possibility of collaboration of the protecting 
Powers charged with safeguarding the interests of belligerents ... (Italics added.) 
There is nothing mandatory here. There is no requirement here that a Protecting 
Power actually be designated or that, if designated, it be permitted to function 
as such by the Detaining Power. The comparable provision of the 1949 
Convention reads quite differendy. Article 8 of this latter convention provides: 
The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of 
the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to 
the conflict .... (Italics added.) 
It would appear that the designation of Protecting Powers has now become at 
least a moral obligation of the belligerent; and that, once designated, a Protecting 
Power has a duty not only to the Power of Origin, 25 but also to the other parties 
to the conflict, to ~erform the functions which have been assigned to it by the 
1949 Convention. 6 
What are the qualifications required of a state before it may be designated as 
a Protecting Power? It must, first of all, be a state within the meaning of that 
term in international law. It must also, of course, be a neutral state--and it is 
advisable that it be one which can reasonably be expected to remain neutral, 
although this latter qualification has become more and more difficult to assure. 
And, finally, it must be a state which maintains diplomatic relations with both 
the requesting state (the Power of Origin) and the state in which it is being 
requested to operate (the Detaining Power). 
How does a state actually become a Protecting Power? The belligerent state 
desiring the services of a Protecting Power requests a neutral state which has the 
qualifications listed above to act on its behal£ If the latter is willing to assume 
the functions of a Protecting Power, it so notifies the requesting state. It must 
then obtain from the Detaining Power permission to function as the Protecting 
Power for the requesting state vis-a-vis and within the territory of the Detaining 
Power.27 In other words, the actual designation of the Protecting Power is based 
upon the request of the Power of Origin and the consent of both the proposed 
Protecting Power and the Detaining Power.28 
As we have seen, it has frequendy occurred in the past that more than one 
state has been designated as the Protecting Power for a belligerent, and there is 
nothing in the 1949 Convention, nor in general international law, to preclude 
this practice. However, the advantages of the other extreme-one and the same 
Protecting Power for both belligerents-are many. Even a small nation, when 
acting as the Protecting Power for both sides, is in a unique position to obtain 
a general observance of the law of war by each belligerent on the basis of 
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reciprocity. This was made quite apparent during World War II, when 
Switzerland acted as the Protecting Power for many of the belligerents on both 
sides of the conflict. Some of the advantages of this situation are summed up as 
follows: 
For uniformity and simplicity of administration it is obviously desirable for the 
protected power to entrust its interests in another country to only one protecting 
power, and in instances involving the protection of belligerent interests there are 
advantages to all concerned ifboth belligerents entrust their interests in the other's 
territory to the same protecting power .... The experience of World War II 
indicates that a more uniform administration and a higher standard of treatment 
of enemy interests by both belligerents result from a reciprocal protection of the 
interests of those belligerents by the same protecting power throughout the 
territories under the control of each belligerent?9 
The limited number of states which would be available and competent to act as 
Protecting Powers in any future world conflagration would, in all probability, 
almost automatically bring about this result, just as it did during World War II. 
The delegates at the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 1949 
Convention foresaw the ~ossibility of numerous situations in which there would 
be no Protecting Power. 0 They attempted to solve this problem by providing 
in Article 10 of the convention for the designation of "substitutes" for Protecting 
Powers.31 It must, however, be emphasized that the provisions of this article 
should not be considered as affecting the basic method of selecting either 
Protecting Power or successor Protecting Powers as long as the Power of Origin 
continues to exist. A successor Protecting Power, necessitated, perhaps, because 
the original Protecting Power has become a belligerent, is not a "substitute" for 
a Protecting Power within the meaning of Article 10, and its designation is 
governed by the same rules of international law as those which govern the 
designation of the original Protecting Power.32 It must also be emphasized that 
a state or organization designated under the provisions of Article 10 is not a 
Protecting Power as that term is used generally in international law and as it is 
used specifically elsewhere in the 1949 Convention, but is merely a state or 
organization performing some or many of the functions allocated to Protecting 
Powers by the convention. 
B. Personnel 
Article 8 of the 1949 Convention provides that 
... the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic and consular 
staff, delegates from amongst their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral 
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Powers. The said delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with 
which they are to carry out their duties. 
It is obvious that the convention has accorded to the Protecting Power two 
sources of personnel for the execution of its functions: its diplomatic and consular 
officers stationed within the territory of the Detaining Power;33 and others of 
its nationals and other neutral nationals specifically appointed for the purpose. 
We shall discuss each of these sources in turn. 
The normal and natural source of personnel for the execution of the functions 
of the Protecting Power is, of course, the diplomatic and consular personnel 
already assigned to and stationed in the territory of the Detaining Power. These 
officials, working under the ambassador, are experienced, they are known to 
the local officials, and, perhaps most important, they are already present within 
the area of operations. It is, of course, true that they already have their usual 
functions to perform; but many of these functions disappear or are seriously 
curtailed upon the advent of war (commercial, immigration, tourists, etc.). 
While any large-scale war of lengthy duration will undoubtedly make it 
necessary for the Protecting Power to supplement its regular diplomatic and 
consular staff within the territory of the Detaining Power, there will be 
numerous instances in which the Protecting Power will be able to perform its 
functions with only its normal complement of officials, at least for some 
considerable period of time and until the number of prisoners of war held by 
the Detaining Power makes a build-up of personnel essential. Of course, the 
term "diplomatic and consular staff" includes not only those officials of the 
Protecting Power who were already stationed within the territory of the 
Detaining Power at the time of the designation of the Protecting Power, but 
also any of its other diplomatic and consular personnel who may be sent to 
replace or supplement them. 
With the heavy commitments which Switzerland had during World War II, 
it would obviously have been impossible for it to have made even a pretense of 
performing its far-flung responsibilities as a Protecting Power without a 
considerable increase in its staffi in the territories of the many Detaining Powers 
where it had consented to function. To accomplish this purpose the Swiss 
Government recruited in Switzerland and sent to its various affected embassies 
and legations "camp inspectors," who had the function of periodically visiting 
prisoner-of-war camps and work areas to assure that there was comRliance by 
the Detaining Power with the provisions of the 1929 Convention.34 This is 
typical of the second source of personnel the use of which is authorized by 
Article 8 of the 1949 Convention-the non-career national who is selected by 
the government of the Protecting Power solely for the purpose of assisting it in 
performing its functions. He may also be the national of another neutral, but 
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nonnally the Protecting Power would resort to this type of selection only when 
it has exhausted its own manpower potential. Of course, a major source of 
non-career personnel is to be found among the nationals of the Protecting Power 
and of other neutral Powers who are residing within the territory of the 
Detaining Power when the use of additional personnel becomes necessary. The 
Protecting Power may sometimes find it more convenient, when it has exhausted 
the list of its own nationals residing in the territory of the Detaining Power, to 
use neutral nationals falling within this category before resorting to the policy 
of recruiting its own nationals in its own territory and sending them to the 
territory of the Detaining Power. 
It will have been noted that these non-career, or auxiliary, personnel are 
subject to the approval of the Detaining Power. This has occasioned considerable 
discussion, both at and since the Diplomatic Conference. No objection can be 
perceived to this procedure. The diplomatic and consular personnel of the 
Protecting Power stationed within the territory of the Detaining Power must 
have the nonnal approval of the state to which they are accredited (agrement, 
exequatur), required for all such personnel, and anyone of them may, at any 
time, be declared persona non grata by that state, the Detaining Power. The writer 
finds himself in complete accord with the statement that 
... it appeared to be incompatible with international usage that the occasional, 
auxiliary and temporary staff recruited by the Protecting Power should enjoy a 
more favorable status than the usual diplomatic or consular staff.35 
The fear has been expressed that a Detaining Power might arbitrarily refuse 
to approve any of the auxiliary personnel nominated by the Protecting Power 
and thereby make it impossible for the latter properly to perfonn its functions. 
But a Detaining Power so minded could also, and with equal ease, arbitrarily 
decline to grant the necessary agrement or exequatur to replacement or 
supplementary diplomatic or consular personnel of the Protecting Power. Either 
of these acts would constitute a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
convention. Until the contrary is affirmatively established, it must be assumed 
that states parties to the convention will carry out their obligations in good faith. 
The restriction which we have just been discussing is logical from another 
standpoint. The individuals concerned will, in the perfonnance of their 
functions, be required to do considerable traveling within a country at war. Any 
country at war must institute controls on the right to enter into and to travel 
within its territory. To tell it that it must accept anyone selected by the Protecting 
Power, even though it has good reason not to trust the particular individual, is 
to close one's eyes to the facts of life. And for this same reason, the Detaining 
Power must retain the right to declare members of the staff of the Protecting 
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Power persona non grata, whether the individual concerned has diplomatic, 
con~ular, or auxiliary status. 
It has been stated that the representatives of the Protecting Power engaged 
in perfonning its functions in the territory of the Detaining Power have a triple 
responsibility: to their own government; to the government of the Power of 
Origin; and to the government of the Detaining Power.36 If this is another way 
of saying that these individuals must be completely neutral and unbiased, it is 
correct. It would, however, be less controversial to state, as did William Jennings 
Bryan, that they are "representatives of a neutral power whose attitude toward 
the parties to the conflict is one of impartial amity ... 37 
C. Functions 
Unfortunately, with only a very few exceptions, the drafters of the 1949 
Convention apparently found it necessary to avoid any attempt to specify in 
detail the functions of the Protecting Power. Most frequently these functions 
are expressed either in the form of duties of the Detaining Power or rights of 
the prisoners of war. Where a precedent had previously been established, it is 
set forth in appropriate detail. Where no precedent had previously been 
established, the problem is normally left to ad hoc decision. It was probably 
anticipated that such problems would be solved by the Protecting Power through 
the exercise by it of the basic power guaranteed to it, that of surveillance to 
insure that there is, at all times, full compliance with the provisions of the 
convention. Should the Protecting Power ascertain that there is a default in the 
performance of some particular provision, it is apparently assumed that it will 
find a means of procuring a correction of the situation, even though such means 
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Nevertheless, the convention does contain repeated references to the 
Protecting Power and a function may usually be implied in a particular instance 
merely from such a reference. It is difficult, indeed, to categorize these varied 
references to the Protecting Power. Extremely broad categories are required, 
and even then not every function will fall within them. Several not wholl~ 
successful efforts have been made to list these references on a functional basis? 
For the purposes of this discussion they will be considered under three general 
categories: powers and duties; liaison functions; and miscellaneous functions (the 
functions listed in each category do not purport to be all-inclusive). 
(1) Powers and Duties: 
The basic and overriding power granted to the Protecting Power by the 1949 
Convention is, of course, that contained in Article 8, the very first sentence of 
which states that the convention 
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... shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting 
Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. 
This provision has been tenned, and rightly so, "the keystone of the 
. ,,40 conventlOns. 
Strangely enough, the only extended debate on this extremely crucial article 
which took place at the Diplomatic Conference concerned the selection of the 
proper word to characterize the activities of the Protecting Power, and that 
debate occurred primarily as a result of difficulties of translation. The delegates 
at the Diplomatic Conference were agreed that the Protecting Power could not 
give orders or directives to the Detaining Power. The idea which it was desired 
to convey was that the authority of the Protecting Power would entitle it to 
verify whether the convention was being properly applied and, if necessary, to 
suggest measures on behalf of prisoners of war.4 In the draft text the words 
"under the supervision of the Protecting Power" were used in the English 
version and the words "sous Ie controle des Puissances protectrices" in the French. 
This was acceptable to the French-speaking delegates but was opposed by those 
who were English-speaking. It eventually became apparent that the two groups 
were actually in agreement and that the seeming dispute had arisen because the 
word "controle" in French is much weaker than either" control" or "supervision" 
in English. The English-speaking delegations were given a choice of a number 
of words to be used as a counterpart for the French word "controle" and 
. ul . 1 h d h d " . ,,42 unarumous agreement was tImate y reac e on t e wor scrutIny. 
The importance of Article 8 may, perhaps, be found to lie in the very 
generality of its phrasing. The fact that the entire convention is to be "applied 
with the cooperation" of the Protecting Power undoubtedly empowers the latter 
to make suggestions to the Detaining Power with a view to the improvement 
of the lot of the prisoner of war even with respect to areas in which no specific 
reference is made to the Protecting Power. Thus, a Protecting Power might 
suggest to, and seek to obtain the agreement of, the Detaining Power that certain 
specified types of offenses committed by prisoners of war be punished by 
disciplinary rather than judicial measures, even though Article 83 contains no 
reference to the Protecting Power. Similarly, the fact that the convention is to 
be applied "under the scrutiny" of the Protecting Power undoubtedly empowers 
it to investigate and to request reports from the Detaining Power in unspecified 
areas. Thus, a Protecting Power might seek from the Detaining Power a 
complete report as to the reasons for delays in the delivery or dispatching of mail 
or for the prohibition of correspondence, even though Article 76, dealing with 
these subjects, contains no mention of the Protecting Power; again, it might 
seek a report from the Detaining Power as to the action taken with respect to 
a complaint made by a prisoner of war, through the Protecting Power, regarding 
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the conditions ofhis captivity, even though Article 78, which authorizes such 
complaints, does not specifically provide for such a report. 
Perhaps on only a slighdy lower level of importance than Article 8 is Article 
126 which empowers the representatives of the Protecting Power to visit all 
places where prisoners of war may be, themselves selecting the places they will 
visit and determining the frequency of the visits; to have access to all premises 
where prisoners are confined; to go to the place of departure, passage, and arrival 
of prisoners who are being transferred; and to interview prisoners and prisoners' 
representatives without witnesses.43 The significant nature of these provisions 
is so patent as to make any discussion superfluous. 
Other powers and duties of the Protecting Power are, indeed, varied. For 
example, it is directed to lend its good offices to assist in settling disputes with 
respect to the application and interpretation of the convention (Article 11); it is 
authorized to inspect the financial records of individual prisoners of war (Article 
65); it may, in the interests of the prisoners, permit the Detaining Power to 
reduce below the specified minimum the number of communications which 
may be sent out each month by each prisoner (Article 71); it may, in the interests 
of the prisoners, propose a limit on the number of packages which a prisoner 
may receive (Article 72); it may itself take over the transport of capture cards, 
mail, packages, and legal documents, should military operations prevent the 
Detaining Power from ful:fi.lling its obligations in this respect (Article 75); it has 
an unrestricted right to receive complaints from individual prisoners and from 
prisoners' representatives (Article 78); it has the right to inspect the record of 
disciplinary punishments (Article 96); and it has the duty to find counsel for a 
prisoner against whom judicial proceedings have been instituted, and the right 
to attend the trial (Article 105). 
(2) Liaison Fundions: 
In its liaison capacity the Protecting Power is actually litde more than a 
conduit. It serves merely as the means of relaying necessary communications 
between the Detaining Power and the Power of Origin. Protecting Powers are, 
not infrequendy, the sole means readily available for the transmittal of messages 
between the two belligerents. And, of course, while a great many liaison 
functions are specifically set forth in the 1949 Convention, this is one area in 
which the Protecting Power may safely operate, even where the particular liaison 
mission which it undertakes is not among those enumerated in the convention. 
The Detaining Power is required to give to the Protecting Power for relay 
to the Power of Origin the geographical location of all prisoner-of-war camps 
so that the prisoners will not, as has happened, accidentally become the target 
of their own compatriots (Article 23). The reasons for any limitations placed by 
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the Detaining Power on the amount of funds made available to a prisoner of 
war from advances of pay must be conveyed to the Protecting Power, 
presumably for transmittal to the Power of Origin (Article 60). The Detaining 
Power must advise the Protecting Power, for relay to the Power of Origin, of 
the rate of daily working pay which it has fixed (Article 62). Transmittals of 
payments by prisoners of war to their own country are made by notification 
from the Detaining Power to the Power of Origin through the medium of the 
Protecting Power (Article 63). Notifications with respect to the status of the 
accounts of prisoners of war (Article 65) and of prisoners whose captivity has, 
for some reason, such as escape, death, or other means, terminated (Article 66), 
are also sent by the Detaining Power to the Power of Origin through the medium 
of the Protecting Power. Claims of prisoners for injury or disease arising out of 
assigned work are similarly transmitted (Article 68). Information with respect to 
the measures taken by the Detaining Power to enable prisoners to communicate 
with the exterior must be transmitted to the Power of Origin through the 
Protecting Power (Article 69). And the Protecting Power must be informed, 
presumably for the information of the Power of Origin, as well as for its own, 
of all offenses punishable by death under the laws of the Detaining Power (Article 
100). 
In several instances the convention provides for the exchange of information 
between the belligerents without specifying how this is to be accomplished. 
Unquestionably, these are areas in which, as noted above, the Protecting Power 
would feel qualified to intervene, even though it has no specific mandate. For 
example, Article 21 provides for an exchange of information between 
belligerents as to their respective laws and regulations on the subject of parole, 
and Article 43 provides for an exchange of information with respect to military 
titles and ranks, but neither of these articles states how the exchange is to be 
made. The Protecting Powers are available and competent to perform this liaison 
function; and it may be assumed that either the Detaining Powers would request 
their services for this purpose or the Protecting Powers would, themselves, offer 
their services for the transmittal of the required information. 
(3) Miscellaneous Functions: 
There are a number of references to the Protecting Power in the 1949 
Convention which cannot rightly be designated as powers or duties but which 
are likewise not precisely liaison functions. For lack of a more descriptive term, 
and because, for the most part, they bear little or no relationship to each other, 
they are here considered as miscellaneous functions. 
Thus, Article 12 provides that if a Detaining Power, to whom prisoners of 
war have been transferred by the original Detaining Power, fails to carry out the 
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provisions of the convention, the original Detaining Power will, upon being 
notified to that effect by the Protecting Power, either take measures to correct 
the situation or request the return of the prisoners concerned. And Article 58 
indicates, without specifically so providing, that some time after the outbreak 
of hostilities the Detaining Power and the Protecting Power will enter into an 
arrangement relating to the possession of money by prisoners of war. 
Again, Article 79 requires the Detaining Power to infonn the Protecting 
Power of its reasons therefor whenever it refuses to approve a duly elected 
prisoners' representative; and Article 81 requires the Detaining Power to infonn 
the Protecting Power of its reasons for dismissing a prisoners' representative. In 
neither of these articles is there any indication of the action it is contemplated 
that the Protecting Power will take when the required infonnation is given to 
it. While the infonnation might, in the exercise of the Protecting Power's liaison 
function and as a matter of routine, be passed to the Power of Origin, this action 
alone would have little significance. Under its right to scrutinize the application 
of the convention, the Protecting Power would probably, in an appropriate case, 
take issue with the Detaining Power's action with respect to the non-approval 
or the dismissal of a prisoners' representative. 
Further, Article 121 provides that the Detaining Power shall investigate and 
make a full report to the Protecting Power of every death or serious injury of a 
prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another 
prisoner of war, or any other person, or where the cause of death is unknown; 
and that if guilt is indicated, the Detaining Power will prosecute the responsible 
persons. Certainly it is to be expected that the Protecting Power will forward 
the report of the incident to the Power of Origin; but it is equally certain that 
the Protecting Power would, on its own initiative, make demarches to the 
Detaining Power, if it felt that the investigation had been inade2uate or that a 
prosecution indicated by the investigation had not taken place.4 
It is believed that the foregoing short presentation of only a few types of 
provisions adequately establishes that the Protecting Power has certain functions 
which cannot exactly be fitted into either the category of powers or duties or 
the category of liaison functions, and that these miscellaneous functions can 
probably become whatever the particular Protecting Power desires them to be. 
(4) Limitations: 
Each of the four conventions drafted at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference 
contains an article similar to Article 8 of the Prisoner of War Convention.45 
However, in the Third and Fourth Conventions (prisoner of War and Civilian 
Conventions, respectively) the Protecting Powers are merely admonished to 
"take account of the imperative necessities of security of the State wherein they 
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carry out their duties," while in the First and Second (Wounded and Sick of 
Anned Forces in the Field-the "Red Cross Convention"-and Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea, respectively), not only are they so admonished, 
but they are told in an oblique fashion that their activities may be restricted "as 
an exceptional and temporary measure when this is rendered necessary by 
imperative military necessities. ,,46 The importance of the distinction drawn 
between the two pairs of conventions was fully appreciated at the time of the 
drafting of the conventions and was the occasion for some spirited debate. While 
on its face the solution reached by the convention is plainly a victory for those 
who sought to exclude the possibility of any shackles being placed on the 
Protecting Power in the perfonnance of its functions with respect to frisoners 
of war, it remains to be seen whether this result was actually attained. 7 
Assuming that the Detaining Power desires to impose the "exceptional and 
temporary" restrictions on visits of the Protecting Power which are authorized 
in Article 126 of the 1949 Convention, or the right to the even more extensive 
restrictions on the activities of the Protecting Power which is asserted by some 
states to exist, whether or not specified in the convention, how and by whom 
is the decision to be made as to whether "imperative military necessities" do, in 
fact, exist? There is one school of thought which takes the position that it would 
be illogical to permit the determination to be made by the Detaining Power 
itself, as it would be judging its own case, and which insists that only the 
Protecting Power can validly make such a determination. 48 While, from a strictly 
humanitarian point of view, there is much to be said in favor of this position, it 
cannot, as a practical matter, be justified. If, for example, the Detaining Power 
deems it essential to keep representatives of the Protecting Power temporarily 
out of an area, lest military movements noted therein inadvertently lead to the 
disclosure of important impending military actions, there would be little logic 
in compelling it to advise the Protecting Power what and why it was so doing 
in order to permit the latter to determine whether imperative military necessities 
actually existed and whether the restriction was really justified. This is 
unquestionably a matter which will, in the course of events and through 
reciprocal actions of the belligerents, adjust itself inasmuch as time and 
experience will very quickly result in an infonnal mutual appreciation as to 
where the line is to be drawn.49 
D. Relationship to the ICRC 
The multifold operations of the ICRC are obviously not within the scope of 
this article. However, inasmuch as the functions of the Protecting Power and 
those of the ICRC often overlap insofar as prisoners of war are concerned, it 
appears appropriate to mention, at least briefly, some of the overlapping areas. 50 
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The basic safeguard to the activities of the I CRC is contained in Article 9 of 
the 1949 Convention, which specifies: 
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the 
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or 
any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the 
Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners of war 
and for their relie£ 
Despite a substantially similar provision in Article 88 of the 1929 Convention, 
the ICRC found, during World War II, that it was, at times, necessary to 
overcome the feeling of some belligerents that it was attempting to duplicate 
the functions of the Protecting Powers. Apparendy it succeeded in convincing 
51 them that such was not the case. 
It has already been pointed out that Article 10 of the 1949 Convention 
contains provisions for the designation of "substitutes" for Protecting Powers 
under certain circumstances. The third paragraph of Article 10 provides that, 
failing such a "substitute," the Detaining Power shall request or accept 
... the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed 
by Protecting Powers under the present Convention. 
It must be emphasized that when the ICRC is thus called upon to serve, it does 
so as a humanitarian organization and not as a Protecting Power which, by 
definition, it cannot be, inasmuch as it is not a state.52 
In a number of areas the convention places the ICRC on the same plane as 
the Protecting Power. As we have seen, Article 126 is of major importance in 
its grant of authority to the Protecting Power to go wherever prisoners of war 
are located. 53 That article also specifies that "The delegates of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the same prerogatives." A similar 
parallel is to be found in Article 56 dealing with the locations of, and visits to, 
labor detachments. And it is not surprising that we find the ICRC referred to 
along with the Protecting Power in Articles 72 and 75, for these two articles are 
among those relating to individual and collective relief shipments, a subject of 
particular interest to the ICRC and one with respect to which it has developed 
an unchallengeable expertise as a result of experience gained in innumerable 
conflicts. Most Protecting Powers would probably be more than \villing to 
permit the ICRC to pre-empt the handling of this difficult and complicated 
function. 
Articles 79 and 81 authorize the prisoners' representatives to communicate 
with the ICRC as well as the Protecting Power. Here, however, it is believed 
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that the purpose of each such authorization to communicate is fundamentally 
different. The creation of the position of prisoners' representative was first 
suggested during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) and became a reality 
during World War 1.54 The function for which it was originally created was to 
receive and distribute relief packages. However, over the course of time, the 
functions of the prisoners' representatives have been gready expanded, and 
during World War II it was not unusual to find them involved in practically all 
of the problems of a prisoner-of-war camp. Thus, they were frequendy used by 
the prisoners as the channel for the transmittal of complaints both to the 
Detaining Power and to the Protecting Power. The drafters of the 1949 
Convention were fully aware of this development,55 and it appears that the steps 
which they took were intended to insure that the privileges accorded to the 
prisoners' representative would permit him to communicate with the delegates 
of the ICRC on problems relating to relief shipments and with the Protecting 
Power on this subject as well as on the myriad of other problems into which 
the prisoners' representative is now projected. 
It is probably safe to state that, while the allocation off unctions by the 1949 
Convention between the Protecting Power and the ICRC is not always as clearly 
stated as it might have been, the fundamental differences between the two and 
between their methods of operation are such that conflicts between them would 
be extremely rare. 56 
III. Conclusion 
The past century has seen tremendous advances made in the concept of the 
Protecting Power as an instrument ofintemationallaw, both in the role which 
it is called upon to play and in the prestige which it enjoys and which goes far 
in assisting it to perform the numerous functions which have now been assigned 
to it. It appears unquestionable that: 
The presence of the Protecting Powers today remains the sole means of putting 
a brake on the excesses of Detaining Powers, the sole element of moderation and 
of morality in the treatment of enemy persons, their belongings, and their interests: 
this was noted and affirmed many times at Geneva.S7 
The results of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference reveal clearly that the nations 
of the world were generally prepar<:d to accept a solid basis for the activities of 
the Protecting Power. It was conceded a mission of close observation of the 
application of the provisions of the Prisoner of War Convention drafted at that 
Conference, a mission which necessarily incorporates within it a right to call to 
the attention of the Detaining Power any failure of performance which it finds 
and to report any such failure of performance to the Power of Origin; a sizeable 
46 Levie on the Law of War 
expansion was made in its functions and, correlatively, in its power and authority; 
provision was made for substitutes for Protecting Powers in order to insure that 
prisoners of war would at all times benefit from the exercise of the functions of 
the Protecting Power, thus correcting the situation which had arisen all too 
frequendy during World War II; and the use of the institution of the Protecting 
Power was extended not only to the Red Cross Convention (Wounded and 
Sick of Armed Forces in the Field), but also to the convention which adapts the 
Red Cross Convention to maritime warfare (Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
at Sea), and to the completely new Civilian Convention.58 These few examples 
alone demonstrate the great distance which has been traversed since 1907, when 
the prisoner-of-war provisions of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land were drafted at The Hague and contained no reference 
whatsoever to the Protecting Power. 
In many respects the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to 
the Protecting Power represent compromises. Positions reached solely in order 
to bring about agreement between opposing viewpoints can rarely be considered 
perfect and the present case is no exception. However, these provisions 
unquestionably represent a great step forward in the evolution of international 
law and would undoubtedly be viewed with amazement by those who drafted 
the first Red Cross Convention in 1864 or even by those who acted on behalf 
of the Protecting Powers as recendy as in 1914, at the beginning of World War 
1.
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The Protecting Power is now a generally accepted institution ofinternational 
law. It is the subject of international agreements to which most of the states of 
the world are parties. There are clear indications that it has been weighed in the 
balance and not been found wanting, with the result that it has been, and in the 
future will continue to be, requested to assume numerous new functions on 
behalf of states at war. 
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or infringe the lawful right of the enemy State." 
26. Siordet states that the designation of a Protecting Power is no longer optional but is now "quasi 
obligatoire" ("De l'Application et du Contrale des Conventions de Geneve de 1949," in 1956 Revue 
Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 464, 468); that it is now put in the "imperative form" (The Geneva 
Conventions of1949: The Question of Scrutiny 36); and that in performing its mission the Protecting Power 
is no longer the special representative of one of the parties, but is "the representative of all the Contracting 
Parties to the Convention" (ibid.). 
27. This is the step which the United States apparently failed to take when it was requested to perform 
the functions of the Protecting Power for Great Britain during the Boer War. See discussion above. 
28. The 1949 Convention contains no provisions with respect to the qualifications of a Protecting Power, 
the method of designation, etc., leaving these problems for settlement under general international law. 
Heckenroth, Les Puissances Protectrices et les Conventions de Geneve 62 and 224 (unpublished thesis, 
Universite d'Aix-Marseille, 1951). This solution will work until one belligerent arbitrarily elects to deny its 
consent to every neutral nominated by its enemy. In the light of the adamant refusal of the U.S.S.R. to permit 
any type ofinspection to take place on its terti tory during peacetime, it seems unlikely that such activity would 
be permitted in time of war, even though the U.S.S.R. participated actively in the drafting of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and has ratified them, as have all of its satellites, \vithout any reservations as to Art. 8. 
29. Franklin, op. cit. 164-165. A similar conclusion is reached in Pictet, Commentary 95-96, wherein this 
statement appears: 
"It became more and more common for these neutral Powers to find themselves responsible for 
representing the respective interests of two opposing Parties at one and the same time. This gave them additional 
authority, and incidentally altered their role; for once a Power represented the interests of two opposing 
belligerents, it became not so much the special representative of each of them, as the common agent of both, 
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or a kind of umpire. This enabled it to bring directly into play that powerful instrument, the argument of 
reciprocity, to obtain the improvements desired." 
In 1945 Switzerland alone represented 34 belligerents, and in many cases it represented opposing 
belligerents in the territory of each other. Eroglu, op. at. 144-148. 
30. For some of these possible situations see Siordet, op. at. 49-53; and Heckenroth, op. at. 229-236. 
31. The French Delegation strongly urged that a provision be included in the 1949 Convention setting 
up an international body to perform the functions of Protecting Powers in the absence of the latter (Final 
Record, Vol. lIB, p. 27; ibid., Vol. III, pp. 30-31). The substance of this proposal was included in Resolution 
2 adopted by the Diplomatic Conference (ibid., Vol. I, p. 361), but, as far as the writer has been able to ascertain, 
no steps have been taken, or are contemplated, to implement the resolution. The U.S.S.R. opposed both the 
original French proposal and the adoption of the resolution, stating as to the latter that it "sees no need to 
consider this question or to create such a body, since the problem of the Protecting Powers has been satisfactorily 
solved by the Conventions established in the present Conference." Declaration made by the Delegation of 
the U.S.S.R. at the time of the signing of the conventions. Ibid., Vol. I. n. 201. 
32. Pictet, Commentary 117-118. All of the Communist countries (and Portugal) made reservations to 
Art. 10 to the effect that they would not recognize as legal "requests by the Detaining Power to a neutral State 
or to a humanitarian organization, to undertake the functions performed by a Protecting Power, unless the 
consent of the Government of the country of which the prisoners of war are nationals is obtained." While 
there is a not unnatural tendency to view with suspicion this position taken almost uniquely by the U.S.S.R. 
and its satellites (see, for example, Brockhaus, "Sov.jetunion und Genfer Kriegsgefangenen-Konvention von 
1949," 2 Ost-Europa Recht 286,291 (1956», it appears to have a valid basis. If there is an existing Power of 
Origin, not only is its consent to the designation of a Protecting Power to act on its behalf essential, but it has 
the right to make the selection itselfin the first place! And the statements made at the Diplomatic Conference 
by Soviet representatives Morosov (Final Record, Vol. II B, pp. 29 and 351) and Sokirkin (ibid., p. 347) make 
it clear that they merely desired to limit specifically the right of the Detaining Power to select a substitute for 
the Protecting Power to those cases where there is no existing Power of Origin-a limitation as to which 
there should have been no dispute. It is to be hoped that by overruling the Soviet thesis the Diplomatic 
Conference did not establish the proposition that a Detaining Power may, on its own, select and designate a 
substitute for a Protecting Power even though there is a Power of Origin in being. 
33. Neither the 1929 Convention nor the working (Stockholm) draft used at the Diplomatic Conference 
includes the term "consular" in specitying the authorized representatives of the Protecting Power. The 
authorization for the Protecting Power to use this category of personnel as representatives was proposed by 
Australia and was unanimously approved. Final Record, Vol. lIB, p. 58. 
34. Janner, op. at. 52. 
35. Siordet, op. at. 27. A provision of the working (Stockholm) draft used at the Diplomatic Conference 
would have required the Detaining Power to give "serious grounds" for any refusal to approve the nomination 
of a non-career individual by the Protecting Power. Final Record, Vol. I, p. 73. This proposal was equally 
lacking in logic, since a state need give no reasons for refusing to agree to the assigrunent to a post in its territory 
of a member of the diplomatic or consular service of the Protecting Power or for declaring such an individual 
persona non grata. The provision was deleted at Geneva. Ibid., Vol. lIB, pp. 58 and 110. 
36. De la Pradelle, "Le Controle de I 'application des Conventions Humanitaires en cas de Conflit armc," 
in 2 Annuaire Fran~ais de Droit International 343, 344 (1956). 
37. Letter oflnstructions of Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, dated Aug. 17, 1914 (9 AJ.I.L. 
Supp. 118 (1915». See also, Franklin, Op. at. 114; United States Foreign Service Manual, Vol. 2, Consular 
Affairs, pars. 924.1 and 931. 
38. "It is not the function of the Protecting Power to command or to overrule; it is its function to observe, 
to comment, to make representations, and to send reports to the outside world. If we are faced with an 
unscrupulous belligerent, the presence of the Protecting Power and the ability of the Protecting Power to 
examine what is going on and to observe is the only preventive measure which we have." Statement of 
Quentin-Baxter, representative of New Zealand, at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, Final Record, Vol. II 
B, p. 344. 
39. Thus, Heckenroth, op. at. 135, and Jauner, op. at. 52, have each listed seven separate categories of 
functions of the Protecting Power, but the lists coincide with respect to only four functions! Still a third 
functional listing appears in Pictet, Commentary 98-99. 
40. Yingling and Ginnane loco at. 397. In the British Army Manual of Military Law (part III, The Law 
of War on Land, 1958) 92, the Protecting Power is termed "the principal organ, apart from the Contracting 
Parties themselves, for ensuring the observance of the Convention." Part III of the Manual was largely the 
work of the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. 
41. Final Record, Vol. II B, p. 110. 
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42. Ibid.; Siordet, op. at. 24-25. 
43. The right of visitation granted by Art. 126 is reiterated in Arts. 56 (labor detachments), 98 (prisoners 
undergoing disciplinary punishment), and 108 (prisoners undergoing judicial punishment). 
44. Pietet, Commentary 571. 
45. See note 19 above. 
46. A similar restriction is contained in Art. 126 of the 1949 Convention with respect to visits to places 
where prisoners of war may be. This is the only area in which the 1949 Convention specifically permits the 
activities of the Protecting Power to be restricted by the Detaining Power. While it is, of course, a very 
important one, it is not believed that a Detaining Power could really justifY the imposition of such a restriction 
except in very rare cases, such as prohibiting visits to extremely forward collecting points during the actual 
course of an attack. 
47. The proponents of the distinction between the two pairs of conventions argued that it was "obvious 
and reasonable that the activities of a Protecting Power in sea warfare and on the field of battle must be 
restricted, "but that as to the Prisoner of War and Civilian Conventions" "the vital force which animates those 
rules and gives them effect is the presence of the Protecting Power." Final Record, Vol. II B, p. 344. The 
pessimism which may be apparent in the text is occasioned by the fact that the U.S.S.R. took the position 
that, even without such a restrictive limitation in the convention, it would exist in fact. Ibid. 345. 
48. Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the Field 101 (1952). Even there it is admitted that "this is precisely 
what it [the Protecting Power] would, in such a case, be debarred from doing. It will only be possible to show 
after the event whether or not the restriction was justified." In Pictet, Commentary, published 8 years later, 
a much more realistic approach is taken (at p. 611): 
"If they are to justifY the prohibition of visits, military necessities must be imperative. Whether they are 
or not is a matter for the Detaining Power alone to decide and the right of supervision of the Protecting 
Powers is restricted by this exercise of sovereignty. Such a decision must not be Iighdy taken, however, and 
any prohibition of visits must be an exceptional measure." 
49. In Pietet, Commentary, 10c. at., the follo\ving remedial procedure is suggested: 
"The Protecting Powers and the International Committee will have the right to bring the temporary 
nature of the prohibition to the notice of the Detaining Power and, after a certain length of time, to request 
it to raise all restrictions. Moreover, the Protecting Power will be able to check afterwards whether the 
prohibition of visits has been used by the Detaining Power to violate the Convention. In any case, it is not in 
the interests of the Detaining Power to misuse this reservation, because it would very soon be suspected of 
deliberately violating the Convention by evading supervision by qualified witnesses." 
50. As stated in the ICRC Report, Vol. I, p. 39: 
"Despite partial overlapping, the functions of the Protecting Power are fundamentally dissimilar in kind 
and extent [from those of the ICRC]. The Protecting Power is the mandatory of one or both belligerents, 
with competency to protect the rights and interests of the States from which it derives authority. The 
Committee is concerned exclusively with humanitarian tasks; its functions are not limited to those which are 
guaranteed by law, but embrace such enterprises in the interests of humanity as appear essential, or which are 
justified through a request made by a belligerent." 
51. Ibid. 
52. In Pietet, Commentary 119, the following statement appears: 
"The Convention in this case [paragraph 3 of Article 10] no longer uses the words 'undertake the functions 
performed by a Protecting Power,' but speaks only of 'humanitarian functions.' The distinction is logical. 
There is no longer any question of a real substitute, and a humanitarian organization cannot be expected to 
fulfil all the functions incumbent on a Protecting Power by virtue of the Conventions." See also Final Record, 
Vol. lIB, pp. 61 and 63. 
53. See above. 
54. ICRC Report, Vol. I, pp. 342-343. At that time a prisoners' representative was known as a "man of 
confidence." In the 1929 Convention they were called "agents." 
55. See, for example, Art. 78, wherein specific provision is now contained permitting individual 
complaints to be transmitted to the Protecting Power either direcdy, as had been provided in Art. 42 of the 
1929 Convention, or through the medium of the prisoners' representative. Although Art. 42 of the 1929 
Convention, the predecessor of Art. 78 of the 1949 Convention, made no mention of the ICRC as an 
authorized recipient of complaints from prisoners of war, the ICRC took the position that "it is, according 
to the spirit of the [1929] Convention, undoubtedly meant to be placed, in this respect, on the same footing 
as the Protecting Powers." ICRC Report, Vol. I, p. 341. This conclusion is subject to dispute and, in view 
of the fact that Art. 78 of the 1949 Convention again omits all reference to the ICRC, it would, in interpreting 
that article, now be even more difficult to accept the ICRC position. Certainly, ifsuch had been the intention 
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of the drafters, they could easily have attained their objective by merely including the ICRC in the article, 
along with the Protecting Power, as they did in a number of other articles. Their failure to do so in the light 
of the announced ICRC position strongly militates against the ICRC interpretation. 
56. Castren, op. at. 95; Pictet, Le Droit International et l'Activite du Comite International de la 
Croix-Rouge en temps de Guerre 25 (1943). It is more probable that, as in World War II, it will be the 
Detaining Power which will object where activities of the ICRC appear to duplicate those being performed 
by the Protecting Power. That the ICRC does not consider the Protecting Power to be a rival, but rather 
another means of making the life of a prisoner of war a litde less miserable, is apparent from the communication 
sent by its President early in the Korean conflict in which he said: "The International Committee views, in 
the activities of the 'Protecting Powers,' a forceful instrument for insuring full implementation of the Geneva 
Conventions and an always desirable corollary to the activities which the Committee itself undertakes." Le 
Comite International de la Croix-Rouge et Ie Conflit de Coree: Recueil de Documents, Vol. I, p. 32. 
57. Heckenroth, op. at. 229. 
58. Ibid. 222. 
59. In Pictet, Wounded and Sick Commentary 101-102, the following statement appears: "As it stands, 
Article 8 is not perfect, far from it. But we have to consider the huge advance which it represents in international 
humanitarian law. We have to realize that, to achieve this much, the diplomats assembled in Geneva had to 
cope with divergent opinions; they had to reconcile the claims of the sovereignty of their respective countries 
with the claims of humanity; and they had to harmonize two opposed conceptions of the role of the Protecting 
Power, viewed by some as their agent (of whom one demands the maximum), by others as the agent of the 
enemy (to whom one accords the minimum )." 
